4 edition of Optimal resource extraction contracts under threat of expropriation found in the catalog.
Optimal resource extraction contracts under threat of expropriation
|Statement||Eduardo Engel, Ronald Fischer.|
|Series||NBER working paper series -- working paper 13742, Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 13742.|
|Contributions||Fischer, Ronald D., National Bureau of Economic Research.|
|The Physical Object|
|LC Control Number||2008612467|
Eﬃcient Expropriation: Sustainable Fiscal Policy in a Small Open Economy threat of expropriation depresses investment, prolonging downturns. It is the incom- During the crisis, Argentina repudiated contracts, froze prices on privately owned utilities, by: Resource extraction contracts under threat of expropriation: Theory and evidence. Review of Economics and Statistics, 95(5), pp Download Full Answer OR Add in library.
Expropriation procedure, also known as condemnation, is the process of implementing the taking of private property under expropriation power. Although it is said that the government has an inherent right to take private land by way of expropriation, due process of law requires following some procedural steps. The threat of expropriation in commercial contracts entered into with states: lessons from the case of Lap Green Networks of Libya and the Zambian government. [Thesis]. University of Cape Town,Faculty of Law,Department of Commercial Law, [cited yyyy month dd].
Expropriation and Nationalization Risk in China cumulative total of approximately $22 billion in For a number of reasons, however, this critically needed foreign investment remains far below its potential level, despite the economic appeal of China as a Author: Lianlian Lin, John R Alison. to effects similar to indirect expropriation but at the same time are not classified as expropriation and do not give rise to the obligation to compensate those affected. Investors may bring expropriation claims with respect to any conduct that is attributable to the host State and in which the latter engaged in its sovereign Size: KB.
Icones generum coelomycetum.
Machinery for wage fixing and wages protection.
Cooling power and weather types in Thesaloniki
On occupational clusters: Early thoughts on organizing the work of the National Skill Standards Board
Models for Writers 8e and Rules for Writers 5e
Girls who answer personals
Urim and Thummim, or, The clergies dignity and duty, recommended in a visitation sermon preached at Lewes, April 27, 1669.
Historic Houses of New York State
Thermal regeneration of activated carbon
arte of logick
Reclamation and environmental grasses.
Purchasing power parity under the European Monetary System
college man and the war.
Encounters, Tasks 49-72 (Encounters, Tasks 49-72)
Schedule of cost of State licenses issuable by Commissioners of Revenue.
Analysis of Nd℗đð́:glass, solar-pumped, high-power laser systems
Optimal Resource Extraction Contracts Under Threat of Expropriation Eduardo Engel, Ronald Fischer. NBER Working Paper No. Issued in January NBER Program(s):Environment and Energy Economics, International Trade and Investment, Public Economics The government contracts with a foreign firm to extract a natural resource that requires an upfront investment.
"Optimal Resource Extraction Contracts Under Threat of Expropriation," NBER Working PapersNational Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. Eduardo Engel & Ronald Fischer, "Optimal Resource Extraction Contracts under Threat of Expropriation," Levine's BibliographyUCLA Department of by: "Optimal Resource Extraction Contracts Under Threat of Expropriation," Center Discussion PapersYale University, Economic Growth Center.
Eduardo Engel & Ronald Fischer, "Optimal resource extraction contracts under threat of expropriation," Documentos de TrabajoCentro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile. 5 Optimal Resource Extraction Contracts under Threat of Expropriation Eduardo Engel and Ronald Fischer We have nationalized copper by unanimous decision of Parliament, where the parties supporting the government are in the minority.
We want the whole world to understand that we have not conﬁscated the large foreign mining Size: KB. Optimal Resource Extraction Contracts Under Threat of Expropriation Eduardo Engel and Ronald Fischer NBER Working Paper No.
January JEL No. H21,H25,Q33,Q34,Q38 ABSTRACT The government contracts with a foreign firm to extract a natural resource that requires an upfront investment and which faces price uncertainty.
Resource Extraction Contracts Under Threat of Expropriation: Theory and Evidence Abstract We use fiscal data on 2, oil extraction agreements in 38 countries to study tax contracts between resource-rich countries and independent oil companies.
We Optimal resource extraction contracts under threat of expropriation book why expropriations occur and what determines the degree of oil price exposure of host Cited by: Get this from a library.
Optimal resource extraction contracts under threat of expropriation. [Eduardo Engel; Ronald D Fischer; National Bureau of Economic Research.] -- The government contracts with a foreign firm to extract a natural resource that requires an upfront investment and which faces price uncertainty.
In states where profits are high, there is a. Resource Extraction Contracts Under Threat of Expropriation: Theory and Evidence Johannes Stroebely Stanford University Arthur van Benthemz Stanford University Abstract We use scal data on 2, oil extraction agreements in 38 countries to study tax contracts between resource-rich countries and independent oil companies.
We analyze. Resource Extraction Contracts Under Threat of Expropriation: Theory and Evidence USAEE Working Paper No. 43 Pages Posted: 18 Cited by: We use fiscal data on 2, oil extraction agreements in 38 countries to study tax contracts between resource-rich countries and independent oil companies.
We analyze why expropriations occur and what determines the degree of oil price exposure of host countries. With asymmetric information about a country's expropriation cost, even optimal contracts feature Cited by: This chapter discusses the most extreme forms of political risk—default and expropriation, which is collectively referred to here as sovereign theft—and their effect on the two most important forms of foreign investment, namely, sovereign debt and direct investment.
Political risk is particularly severe in the case of foreign investments, where the absence of supranational courts limits. The aim of this chapter is to understand the motives behind the contracting problem faced by the government, in the process attempting to rationalize the choices of instruments that are used in practice and finding areas of improvement in the “typical” contract.
The objective is to indicate how some elements of the contract can be introduced in the discussion in order to reduce the Author: Roberto Rigobon. We develop a formal model that looks at the mutually endogenous determination of foreign direct investments in the extraction of natural resources, at the decision of host governments to expropriate these investments, and at the level of corruption.
Higher investments in resource extraction make expropriation more attractive from the perspective of national Cited by: 2. This review highlights the challenges of fiscal system optimization considering both the host government and extraction company perspectives.
Countries around the world face an arduous task in determining the optimal fiscal system to maximize the capture of economic rents of natural resource extraction activities. The extraction industry is equally challenged to meet Cited by: Request PDF | Profit sharing under the threat of nationalization | A multinational corporation engages in foreign direct investment for the extraction Author: Luca Di Corato.
- “Latin America and the Global Economy: Export Trade and the Threat of Protectionism” (editor), Palgrave, UK. - “Las Nuevas Caras del Proteccionismo”, (editor), Dolmen, Septiembre BOOK CHAPTERS (recent) - Engel, E.
and Fischer, R. () Optimal Resource Extraction Contracts Under Threat of Expropriation. Optimal Resource Extraction Contracts under Threat of Expropriation / Ronald Fischer Denying the Temptation to GRAB / Richard Zeckhauser Dealing with Expropriations: General Guidelines for Oil Production Contracts / Roberto Rigobon --Commentary / Erich Muehlegger.
Price or Politics. An Investigation of the Causes of Expropriation for optimal resource extraction contracts under the threat of foreign firms are more vulnerable to expropriation in Author: Rod Duncan.
Expropriation Risk, Investment Decisions and Economic Sectors 1 Introduction The wave of nationalizations in Africa and Latin America since the last decade has brought fear of expropriation back into the picture.
An expropriation can be deﬁned as the seizing of ownership or control rights of the ﬁrm by the government. on extraction depending on the capital intensity of the resource, because of two eﬀects that work in opposite directions: (i) expropriation risk tends to depress investments, which leads to lower capital–reserve ratios, ultimately.
regime change, there is a repudiation of former contracts with foreign firms, increasing the risk of expropriation and thereby reducing the volume of FDI3. An example of a regime change that resulted in the cancellation of contracts with foreign firms and .performs the expropriation and under which Act the expropriations are made it will be determined whether the expropriation will attract VAT at 14% or 0%.
However, the detail contained in section 11(1)(s) and (t) does not lend itself to a clear cut explanation as to the.However, when capital investments are included in the framework there is a second effect of expropriation risk, which depresses investments in physical capital, leading to lower extraction rates.
The total effect is theoretically ambiguous, and arguably depends on .